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LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
IN 2000:
SEEING THE “BIG PICTURE”
Janine Benedet

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The legal rights in sections 7-14 of the Charter1 were among the
first to be developed by the Supreme Court of Canada after the adoption of the
Charter in 1982, and were the vehicle for some of the most important judicial
changes to Canadian law, and in particular Canadian criminal law. 2 The year
2000 did not offer the Supreme Court of Canada many opportunities to apply or
expand this jurisprudence. It did, however, provide the Court with four cases
which raised claims under sections 7, 11(c), 11(d) and 12 of the Charter: two
criminal cases, one human rights investigation and one child protection
proceeding.3 This comment focuses on the Court’s decisions in two cases which
raised claims under section 7 of the Charter in the context of proceedings
important to women’s equality. Both of these cases demonstrate a commitment
on the part of the Court to contextualize the interpretation of legal rights to take
into account interests beyond those of the immediate parties to the case. In this
paper, I argue that this trend is justifiable in both the human rights and the
criminal contexts at issue in the past year’s appeals.

_______________________________________________________________
*

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario. This paper was
originally presented at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth
Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional
Development Program at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
See, e.g., Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
103; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
3
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307;
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519; R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 443; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90.
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II. SECTION 7 AND ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY: BLENCOE
The promise of the human rights system to provide quick, informal and
meaningful remedies where there has been unlawful discrimination continues to
be unfulfilled. In fact, the human rights process is best described as slow,
cumbersome and meagre in its outcome for most complainants. In Ontario, for
example, the effective response to the growing backlog of cases has been to
shrink the caseload by dismissing complaints at the outset and by shunting
claimants to alternate forums such as grievance arbitration and mediation, thus
undermining the public interest role of the human rights framework.4 In Blencoe,
the Supreme Court of Canada examined this problem in the form of a section 7
challenge by a human rights claim respondent on the ground of unreasonable
delay to proceedings before the B.C. Human Rights Commission.
Robin Blencoe was a cabinet minister in the British Columbia NDP
government. In March 1995, Blencoe’s assistant asserted that he had sexually
harassed her. The allegation led to an inquiry and to Blencoe’s dismissal from
Cabinet and from the NDP caucus. These events were covered widely in the
press. Blencoe’s assistant did not file a human rights complaint. Several months
later, two other women who had professional dealings with Blencoe did file
human rights complaints against him, stating that he had sexually harassed
them as well.
Blencoe fought the complaints with full force. He objected to the timeliness
of the complaints when the women sought relief from the statute’s miserly sixmonth limitation period. He demanded to see documents forwarded by the
complainants in reply to his response, and to make additional submissions,
despite the fact that this was a departure from the Commission’s normal
procedures. Both his counsel and the complainants’ counsel did file their
various documents efficiently. The Commission, however, was responsible for
a number of periods of mostly unexplained delay; the longest amounted to five
months. The hearing was scheduled to take place 32 months from the date of
the filing of the complaints.
Blencoe commenced an application for judicial review, seeking a stay of
proceedings on the ground that the unreasonable delay was an abuse of process
and violated section 7 of the Charter. This application was dismissed by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, but allowed by a majority of the B.C.
Court of Appeal, Lambert J.A. dissenting. On further appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Court unanimously held that the hearing should proceed.
However, four members of the Court would have found a violation of
_______________________________________________________________

4
Etherington, “Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice” (2000), 26
Queen’s L.J. 43, at 51-62.
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administrative law principles of fairness that merited some remedy short of a
stay.
The majority reasons were written by Justice Bastarache, who began by
noting the existence of some disagreement in the lower courts as to the
application of section 7 to non-criminal proceedings, at least in the context of
pre-hearing delay. Bastarache J. confirmed that section 7 is not restricted to the
criminal law. So long as there is state action that directly engages the justice
system, section 7 can be invoked. Delay in human rights proceedings could
provide a basis for the claim.
However, he cautioned that the recognition that section 7 can apply in this
context should not be conflated with an assessment of whether Blencoe’s rights
to life, liberty or security of the person had been infringed. This is an
independent consideration that must be satisfied before proceeding to consider
the principles of fundamental justice.
The majority considered and rejected Blencoe’s contention that the effects of
the delay, and in particular the ongoing psychological stress and stigma from the
unresolved complaints, infringed his liberty interest. Bastarache J. noted that
while the liberty interest extends beyond direct physical restraint to protect the
right to make fundamental personal decisions about one’s own life free from state
interference, no such fundamental personal choices were at issue in this case.
Turning to security of the person, Bastarache J. described the reach of this
interest to include not only interferences with bodily integrity but also serious
state-imposed psychological stress. On the facts, he found that neither
component of this definition was satisfied; the harm was neither state-imposed
nor sufficiently serious. Blencoe had suffered most of his considerable stress
and stigmatization on his dismissal from Cabinet, well before the filing of the
human rights complaint or any delays in the proceedings. Bastarache J.
disagreed that the delay in the human rights process had significantly
exacerbated the prejudice. Any infringement of psychological security was not
state-imposed.
In the alternative, Bastarache J. also found that the interference with
Blencoe’s psychological integrity was not sufficiently serious. He cautioned
that while “dignity” is an underlying value in Charter analysis, it is not a
freestanding constitutional right, whose deprivation triggers section 7. The real
interest asserted by Blencoe was damage to reputation and social stigma. But
these interests were also not Charter rights. What was required was a state
interference with an individual interest of fundamental importance that had a
serious and profound effect on Blencoe’s psychological integrity. It is clear
from the majority’s reasons that the Court envisions this to be a narrow
category:
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It is only in exceptional cases where the state interferes in profoundly intimate and
personal choices of an individual that state-caused delay in human rights
proceedings could trigger the s. 7 security of the person interest. While these
fundamental personal choices would include the right to make decisions concerning
one’s body free from state interference or the prospect of losing guardianship of
one’s children, they would not easily include the type of stress, anxiety and stigma
that result from administrative or civil proceedings.5

While the Court is correct not to trivialize the definition of “security of the
person” to encompass every annoyance or prejudice occasioned by the
operation of state action, the alternate definition imposed by the Court does not
entirely make sense. In particular, it is unclear how courts could ever find delay
in the human rights process that “interferes in profoundly intimate and personal
choices”. Bastarache J.’s definition of security of the person seems in fact to
exclude human rights delay entirely from its ambit, contrary to his earlier
claim.
Even if the start of the media attention in this case had been coincident with
the human rights complaints — if Blencoe’s assistant had also filed a
complaint, and done so at the time her allegations were made public — and
even if the delay had been longer than 32 months, how could it ever operate so
as to affect an “intimate personal choice” of Blencoe? It is hard to imagine a
situation in which the result of an unresolved human rights proceeding is the
inability of the person affected to regain custody of their children or to control
what happens to their own body. It might have been clearer to simply exclude
this claim from the ambit of the security of the person interest altogether, than
to reserve some space for a Kafkaesque delay.
In any event, the Court rejected Blencoe’s characterization of the delay as an
assault on his dignity or his privacy interests. The public scrutiny of Blencoe
was largely the result of his decision to inject himself into the public realm.
Any invasion of his privacy was not the result of the Commission’s actions, nor
was it appropriate for Blencoe to compare himself to complainants in sexual
assault trials facing disclosure of their therapeutic records:
Few interests are as compelling as, and basic to individual autonomy than, a
woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy, an individual’s decision to terminate
his or her life, the right to raise one’s children, and the ability of sexual assault
victims to seek therapy without fear of their private records being disclosed. Such
interests are indeed basic to individual dignity. But the alleged right to be free from
stigma associated with the human rights complaint does not fall within this narrow

_______________________________________________________________
5

Blencoe, supra, note 3, at para. 83.
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sphere. The state has not interfered with the respondent’s right to make decisions
that affect his fundamental being.6

This passage is as reassuring for its recognition of women’s rights to abortion
and to equality in sexual assault trials as it is for its perspective on the degree of
harm to Blencoe attributable to the delay.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the majority reasons in Blencoe is the
rejection of the analogy to section 11(b) of the Charter as applied in criminal
cases. The Court makes clear that while section 7 can apply to proceedings
outside the penal context, this does not mean that the section 11(b) right to be
tried within a reasonable time can be imported into section 7 in the human rights
context. The Court rejects in strong language the tendency of some courts to
equate human rights complaints, and in particular sexual harassment complaints,
with criminal charges:
In contrast to the criminal realm, the filing of a human rights complaint implies no
suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the state. The investigation by the
Commission is aimed solely at determining what took place and ultimately to settle
the matter in a non-adversarial manner. The purpose of human rights proceedings is
not to punish but to eradicate discrimination. Tribunal orders are compensatory
rather than punitive. The investigation period in the human rights process is not one
where the Commission “prosecutes” the respondent.7

This distinction bears repeating. When the first comprehensive antidiscrimination laws were passed in the United States and Canada in the 1960s,
it was easy to understand that they were remedial rather than punitive, since
overt or explicit discrimination was the norm, and in many cases statesupported.
It
was
therefore
clear,
at
least
to
those who supported the laws, that they were designed to correct an injustice
rather than to stigmatize individuals as evil. As discrimination becomes less
overtly acceptable, however, complaints of discrimination, especially when
directed at individual respondents, have at times taken on an accusatory
flavour, especially in the media. Of course, this is also in part because they are
increasingly so hard-fought by respondents like Blencoe.
Treating sex discrimination claims as criminal charges is both not true to the
spirit of human rights legislation and a factor that encourages legalization of
human rights proceedings, which in turn spawns delay. To avoid the de facto
criminalization of sexual harassment and other discrimination claims, members of
equality-seeking groups will also have to refrain from viewing every successful
_______________________________________________________________
6
7

Id., at para. 86.
Id., at para. 94.
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discrimination claim as proof of personal fault, and be content with a process that
provides a speedy and meaningful remedy to the complainant.8
The dissent in Blencoe does not undertake a section 7 analysis. Rather, the
dissenting judges disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Blencoe was not
entitled to any remedy for the effects of the delay based on administrative law
principles of fairness. While the majority and the dissent disagreed on the
effects of the delay in this case, and whether it could be described as “unfair” in
this sense, they agreed that the stay of proceedings granted by the Court of
Appeal was inappropriate in the circumstances. Both majority and dissent note
that the interests of the complainants must also be considered in assessing the
appropriate remedy, and that the case is not a “pure conflict between the
respondent and the state.”9 A stay was not to be the preferred form of redress
where other remedies, such as an order for an expedited hearing or for costs,
were available.10

_______________________________________________________________

8
The trend to viewing these proceedings as adversarial and punitive is probably
exacerbated by the increasing use of grievance arbitration as a forum for addressing sexual
harassment complaints, as human rights commissions try to decrease their backlog by shifting as
many cases as possible into that forum. Arbitrations are often explicitly punitive, in that they
determine whether disciplinary sanctions imposed on an employee for his or her actions are just,
and can pit members of the same bargaining unit against one another. The increasing reliance on
wrongful dismissal actions by persons fired from non-union positions for sexual harassment has
also added to this atmosphere: Bannister v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d)
577 (C.A.); Gonsalves v. Catholic Church Extension Society of Canada (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th)
339 (Ont. C.A.).
9
Blencoe, supra, note 3, at para. 139, per LeBel J., dissenting.
10
Blencoe is consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Winnipeg Child and Family Services
v. K.L.W., supra, note 3, released one week later. The Court, by a 5:2 majority, dismissed a section
7 challenge to section 21(1) of the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act, which permitted child
welfare authorities to apprehend children in need of protection without prior judicial authorization
even in non-emergency situations. The Court characterized the apprehension of a child from a
parent as an interference with the security of the person of both the parent and the child. However,
the majority found the legislative scheme to accord with the principles of fundamental justice when
taking into account the child’s right to life and health, the state’s parens patriae duty to protect
children, and the difficulty and risk inherent in either taking the time to seek judicial authorization
or in waiting until the situation can clearly be classified as an emergency. Section 7 of the Charter
was satisfied by a prompt post-apprehension hearing. Once again, in this case, the Court preferred a
“delicate and contextual balancing” (at para. 48) that turned on the characterization of child
protection legislation as “a child welfare statute and not a parents’ rights statute” (at para 80,
quoting T. v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) (2000), 188 D.L.R. (4th) 603, at para. 14 (Alta.
C.A.)).

Job Name: SCLR14

Time:15:00

1st proofs

Date:Tuesday, May 01, 2012

(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Legal Rights

103

III. SECTION 7 AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: DARRACH
The Supreme Court of Canada in 2000 considered legal rights in the criminal
context in R. v. Darrach.11 The accused in this case challenged the
constitutionality of a number of amendments to the Criminal Code12 provisions
on sexual assault following the Court’s decision in R. v. Seaboyer.13 In
particular, Darrach argued that the sexual history provisions enacted to replace
those struck down in Seaboyer violated his rights to silence and to a fair trial
under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, and his section 11(c) right not to
testify against himself.
Although this decision was billed as an important one by both defence
lawyers and women’s groups, 14 they both overstate its significance. Before the
Ontario Court of Appeal, Darrach had also challenged the constitutionality of
the “reasonable steps” provision under section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.
This issue, had it been raised before the Supreme Court of Canada, could have
required the Court to confront the continuing validity of its “stigma”
jurisprudence and might, if the provisions were upheld, have encouraged judges
to stop ignoring the section.
With this aspect of the Darrach case not before the Supreme Court, the
appeal became a challenge to provisions that were nearly identical to those
judicially legislated by McLachlin J. in her decision in Seaboyer. This can be
contrasted with the Criminal Code records provisions at issue in R. v. Mills,15
which represented a substantial and welcome departure by Parliament from the
inadequate common law regime laid down in R. v. O’Connor.16 Not
surprisingly, the Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Mills to support the
result in Darrach. If the “dialogue” approach to the balance of constitutional
power between courts and legislatures favoured by the court in Mills was
sufficient in that case to uphold statutory provisions quite different from those
created in O’Connor, it is hardly surprising that the Court in Darrach upheld
legislation that followed much more closely its directions in Seaboyer. Yet
inasmuch as Mills can be read as a repudiation of the Court’s own majority
reasons in O’Connor in favour of the dissenting reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé J.
in that case, so too does the reasoning in Darrach adopt at least some of the
understanding of sexual assault found in her Seaboyer dissent.
_______________________________________________________________
11

Supra, note 3.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
13
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
14
Bailey, “Top Court Rejects Rape-Shield Challenge” Toronto Star (13 October 2000) N3;
Chwialkowska, “Rape Shield Law Upheld by High Court: Unanimous Decision” National Post (13
October 2000) A4.
15
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
16
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
12
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The accused in Darrach raised four main objections to the Code scheme, two
of which were described as substantive and two procedural. First, the accused
objected to the rule in section 276(1) that prohibits introduction of sexual history
evidence to attack the complainant’s credibility or to prove her consent, on the
ground that this violated his right to make full answer and defence. The Court
rejected the defence’s characterization of this rule as a blanket exclusion, noting
that evidence was only excluded when tendered in support of the “twin myths” of
credibility and consent, myths that are not relevant and distort the trial process.
Sexual history evidence that is not excluded by the operation of section
276(1) is subject to a balancing process under section 276(2)(c) to determine
admissibility. Such evidence is admissible where it has significant probative
value that is not substantially outweighed by prejudice to the proper
administration of justice. The defence unsuccessfully challenged the
requirement that the probative value of the evidence be “significant”. Gonthier
J. noted that the balance under section 276(2)(c) could be said to be heightened
on both sides of the equation. This is appropriate, given the Court’s recognition
in both its majority and dissenting reasons in Seaboyer that the introduction of
sexual history evidence carries with it inherent damages and disadvantages to
overall trial fairness.
On the procedural side, Darrach challenged the statutory require-ment to
produce an affidavit by or on behalf of the accused and to establish
admissibility on a voir dire in which the accused could be cross-examined on
his affidavit. The Court held that this procedure did not violate an accused’s
section 11(c) right not to be compelled to testify against himself. Gonthier J.
noted that this procedure was consistent with the law of evidence in requiring a
person who seeks to adduce restricted evidence to show that it is admissible to
support some relevant inference. Section 11(c) prohibits legal compulsion of
the accused. The accused who seeks to introduce sexual history evidence faces
a tactical burden, not a legal one. The accused is under no obligation to call
evidence; the tactical burden necessarily arises where the Crown makes out a
prima facie case and the accused wishes to avoid being convicted.
The Court also rejected the argument that this procedure violated the
accused’s right to silence by forcing him to reveal his defence. As the Court
correctly points out, while the accused has a right to silence before trial and
while there is no obligation on the accused to disclose evidence to the Crown,
at trial it will be necessary for the accused to identify his defences. The right to
make full answer and defence, Gonthier J. confirms, “does not include the right
to defend by ambush.”17 In this case, the accused’s refusal to be cross-examined
on his affidavit made it worthless as evidence and prevented the trial judge
_______________________________________________________________
17

Darrach, supra, note 3, at para 55.
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from establishing whether the evidence sought to be admitted was relevant to a
defence the accused sought to advance at trial. 18
Finally, the Court confirmed the constitutional validity of section 276.2(2) of
the Code, which states that the complainant is not a compellable witness on the
voir dire to determine admissibility. The Court recognizes that without such a
rule, the purpose of the sexual history provisions would be defeated and the
voir dire opened up to a fishing expedition by the accused. In the first Code
provisions on sexual history evidence, the complainant was considered a
compellable witness at the voir dire.19 This proved to be a significant limitation
on achieving the goals of the legislation, since the end result was that
complainants could always be cross-examined at least once on their sexual
history, even if the prospective evidence was grossly unreliable.
Significantly, the Court in its analysis in Darrach considers the interests of
sexual assault complainants in the analysis of the section 7 right itself, rather
than leaving these concerns to section 1. The Court does this by relating the
rights in section 11(c) and (d) to the principles of fundamental justice in section
7, which also include interests other than the accused’s. The Court concludes
that the fair trial protected by section 11(d) is one that does justice to all the
parties, including the complainant in a sexual assault trial. While the result may
be the same, this analytical choice is significant and, I would argue, correct.
In the same way that Blencoe criticized some courts and tribunals for treating
human rights proceedings like criminal trials, it can be argued that the Court’s
approach to section 7 and the other legal rights in Darrach treats criminal trials
like administrative decisions. Considering the interests of complainants in the
body of the right, so the argument goes, ignores the fact that it is the accused
who is in jeopardy and facing the loss of his physical liberty.
Those who argue that the complainant’s interests have no place in the section
7 or 11(d) analysis conceive the tension as one between the accused’s right to
make full answer and defence and the complainant’s interest in her privacy and
reputation. This was essentially the formulation relied on by the majority in
both Seaboyer and in O’Connor. On this understanding of the interests at stake,
the accused’s rights will always take precedence. The criminal process is
inherently invasive of personal privacy, although sexual assault complainants
have clearly been subjected to a special hell in this regard. But where evidence
is truly relevant, its admission cannot be avoided by characterizing it as private,
_______________________________________________________________
18

The Court did confirm that the voir dire is a proceeding to which section 13 of the
Charter applies, meaning that the accused’s evidence at the voir dire cannot be used against him at
trial except for the limited purpose of impeaching credibility through a prior inconsistent statement:
R. v. Kuldip, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 618.
19
S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 8.
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absent an interest that rises to the level of privilege. This understanding of what
is at issue, however, is based on two faulty assumptions.
The first fallacy is that the introduction of sexual history evidence is
necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence. That contention is
only true if the right to make full answer and defence is understood as a right to
introduce any evidence that might lead a jury to acquit, even if that acquittal
occurs by relying on myths and stereotypes. It is for this reason that the rule
that sexual history evidence cannot be tendered to support an inference that the
complainant was more likely to consent, or is less worthy of belief, is clearly
not a violation of the accused’s rights. Accused persons do not have a right to
introduce evidence that is not probative of a matter in issue.
Second, characterizing the complainant’s main interest as her right to
privacy is also inaccurate. Any sexual assault complainant in the criminal
process will experience an invasion of her privacy. She will be asked to recount
the events of the assault in vivid detail in a public forum in front of strangers,
and will be vigorously cross-examined on any discrepancy that might
demonstrate that she is either lying or unreliable. Details of any medical
examination following the assault may also be publicly explored.
The use of sexual history evidence is wrong not because it invades the
complainant’s privacy but because it undermines the sex equality rights of
complainants. Sexual assault is a practice by men against women, and
sometimes against other men, that asserts and perpetuates the inequality of
women to men as a class. One example of this inequality is that women are
categorized and judged on the basis of their past sexual behaviour. While it is
often argued that a relaxation of sexual mores has diluted the effect of this socalled madonna-whore dichotomy, the result of this social shift may simply be
that more women are considered whores than before.
In any sexual assault trial where the issue is not identity, the defence is that
the complainant is either lying as to her lack of consent or at least was
equivocal in expressing her lack of interest. To use a woman’s sexual history to
encourage a trier of fact to reach such a conclusion locks the complainant, and
all women, into a self-reinforcing system in which there is no societal response
to the violations that contribute to inequality because of the sexist attitudes that
inequality produces. This is sex discrimination.
The right to sex equality, protected by sections 15 and 28 of the Charter, is a
right with constitutional status and whose deprivation, unlike invasions of
privacy, cannot be said to be either inherent in the criminal trial process or
subordinate to defence interests. The Court implicitly recognizes the different
status of these interests in Mills, in a passage quoted with approval in Darrach:
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It is clear that the right to make full answer and defence is not engaged when the
accused seeks information that will only serve to distort the truth-seeking purpose of the
trial, and in such a situation, privacy and equality rights are paramount. On the other
hand, where the information contained in a record directly bears on the right to make full
answer and defence, privacy rights must yield to the need to avoid convicting the
innocent.20

Note that equality rights have disappeared from the second sentence. Must the
complainant’s sex equality rights also “yield to the need to avoid convicting the
innocent”?21 If an accused can only be acquitted through an appeal to
discriminatory attitudes, what possible meaning does the word “innocent” have
in this sentence?
There are still some problems for women with the decision in Darrach,
however. The Court continues to believe that sexual history evidence is often
relevant to the defence of mistaken belief. This approach is inconsistent with both
the reasonable steps provision in section 273.2(b) and the definition of consent
endorsed by the Court in R. v. M. (M.L.)22 and in R. v. Ewanchuk,23 all of which
post-date Seaboyer.
In these cases, the Court makes clear that non-consent in law is not a
behaviour manifested by the complainant in the form of resistance but rather a
subjective state of mind of the complainant at the time of the sexual assault.
There is no doctrine of implied consent in Canadian criminal law, such that the
question is not whether the complainant said no, but rather whether she said
yes. The Court has also made clear since Seaboyer that consent is to a person,
an act and a circumstance, and that the belief that a complainant would consent
on the basis of past behaviour is not the same as a belief that the complainant
did in fact consent at the relevant time. The reasonable steps provision
precludes the accused from relying on a belief in consent unless he takes
reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to him at the time, to ascertain the
complainant’s consent.
Unfortunately, the Court also endorses the “pattern of conduct” exception to
the exclusion of sexual history evidence, noting that this may be an example of
sexual history evidence being tendered for its non-sexual features. Past sexual
conduct by the complainant with persons other than the accused is wholly
irrelevant to the complainant’s consent to the accused on a subsequent
occasion. This is true even if that conduct can somehow be described as
showing a “pattern of behaviour.” No woman is in a state of perpetual consent,
_______________________________________________________________
20
21
22
23

Mills, supra, note 15, at para. 94, quoted in Darrach, supra, note 3, at para. 43.
Darrach, supra, note 3, at para. 43.
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 3.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
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despite the concerted efforts of pornography to present all women in that way.
Knowledge of this history also does not change what would be “reasonable”
steps in the circumstances on the part of the accused.
Perhaps the Court means to confine this exception to situations where the
“pattern” of past sexual conduct is with the accused himself, as was the case in
Darrach. This might mean only that a pattern of past consensual contact
between the complainant and the accused might form the basis for the
accused’s assertion that a failure to take certain steps to ascertain consent was
nonetheless “reasonable.” Yet the Court does not appear to be speaking so
narrowly in declaring sexual history evidence often relevant to either a pattern
of conduct generally or the mistaken belief defence, and even this narrower
formulation has its concerns. Just because the Crown has the legal burden of
proving non-consent does not mean that a man can presume consent in fact,
even where there has been past consensual conduct. Under this approach, it is
the man’s view of what constitutes a “pattern” of behaviour that counts. This
presents particular challenges for women who are in relationships that have
been characterized by ongoing violence, such that the violence may be invoked
as the normal pattern accompanying sexual contact.

IV. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment in the workplace is an act of sex discrimination in
employment; the legal remedy for this harm is attained through a human rights
proceeding. Excessive delay in the human rights system harms both
complainants and respondents, although the harm to respondents from ongoing
stigma and publicity is not a state-imposed infringement of liberty or security
of the person. Staying proceedings that have been subject to lengthy delay,
however, serves only respondents. The result for complainants is no remedy at
all.
Sexual assault is an act of sex discrimination that is also a crime. Where the
state seeks to punish such crime through the mechanism of a criminal trial, a
complainant will almost always be subject to attacks on her credibility through
cross-examination, while the accused necessarily has no obligation to testify
and face a direct challenge to his version of events. Acting to prevent further
discrimination to complainants in the criminal process by requiring the accused
to satisfy certain standards before attacking the complainant with her sexual
history does not do much to alter these facts. Recognizing this is important in
assessing constitutional objections to this procedure. In Blencoe and in
Darrach, the Supreme Court of Canada saw the bigger picture, and got it right.
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